oXo>c avri8i?7pi?jubov* It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there beany thing at all positively opposite to God. —

But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from *v|?i* aTrotoc, unqualified matter (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd), nor yet from a *-(fju^t)* ayovc, an irrational and maleficent soul of the world, or demon, self-existent from eternity ; we shall, therefore, hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or demon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth,to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Ti-mams Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Tim8BUS,[R] *on fjL€fjLtyfi£vrf* rouSe rov KOtTftou *J&V&GLG* f£ avay-*KTJC; teal vov* augrao-fwc, *vov* Sc dvay/CTje ap^ov-roc" That the generation of this world is mixed, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so, as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity. — Wherefore, though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For, first, as to moral evils (which are the chiefest), there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower